Collecting Your Own Rainwater

Clayton notes that it’s illegal in Utah, and I believe in many western states, to collect rainwater. People are weird about water in the West, because there’s not generally enough to go around, which I supposed is where the western phrase “Whiskey is for drinkin’, and water is for fightin’.” originated from. I suppose these were the rules, odd though they may be, that stopped people from killing each other over water rights.

The Truth About Fair Use

The blogosphere loves itself a good controversy, and it looks like we have yet another one generated by the folks at Truth About Guns, courtesy of Weer’d Beard, who also links to a thread over at Reddit. Once again, this involves accusations of appropriations of intellectual property, refuted with a claim of fair use.

There have been accusations of a similar type made against Truth About Guns that I do indeed think fall quite probably into fair use. Their use if Weerd’s banner, for instance, is arguably fair. I use the word arguably, because there’s a lot of room for that when it comes to the legal implications of this topic. It’s not nearly as cut as dry as TTAG’s responses would have you believe. Fair use is kind of like Justice Potter’s infamous statement about pornography, in that he knows it when he sees it. While their are some pretty sound guidelines as to fair use, what is and isn’t fair use is not so cut and dry that one can just declare it, and that is the end of it.

You will get no argument from me that the Internet implicates necessary adjustments to how our society thinks about intellectual property, and copyright laws in particular. But the law is what it is. We’ve all used bits of material derived from other works, at one time or another, in the course of blogging. This is not what I think is imprudent behavior on the part of TTAG. What is imprudent, among other things, is blowing off a copyright holder when he claims your use is infringing, with claims that it’s clearly fair. It’s not clearly fair, because the law doesn’t work that way.

The prudent reaction is “What can I do to make this better?” All the author may want is clear attribution, or some other minor concession, and you both get to walk away happy. Even if the demand is to cease using the work, it’s a one post loss. What’s it to you? A blogger should be willing to work with a copyright holder who claims his use of their material isn’t fair. The copyright holder has the upper hand in this matter legally. So why make an issue of it?

More on Searches

A commenter brought up an interesting point in regards to the search of Cemetery’s vehicle, from a lawyer who says the 4th Amendment is alive and well, and it’s still possible to win 4th Amendment cases:

Your real concern is that all other things being equal, police are going to be believed in court over citizens. Well, yea, and that’s always been true, and likely always will be. The advice to have your own camera rolling is well taken.

I think that is partly my concern. If I think about the issue a bit more, what I really think I have an issue with are the dogs. Don’t get me wrong, I have no issue with the use of dogs in police work, or even the use of dogs for their noses in police work. I do have an issue with dogs amounting to probable cause for a search. Let me explain.

It is conceivable that sometime soon, technology will allow us to replace the dog’s nose. In this instance, police will be able to circle your vehicle with a device that takes in air samples, and looks for signatures of contraband. The interesting thing about this technology is, I think it actually would enhance civil liberties. I can’t cross examine a dog to find out what was going through its mind when it “alerted.” I can demand the logs from the device, demand to see its service records, and examine the science behind its function.

Even if it ends up a matter of judicial notice that the devices are reliable, and a reading can amount to probable cause, the officer at least would have to induce a reading somehow if he wanted to act merely on his suspicion, rather than just read the tea leaves of a dog’s behavior.

What’s interesting about such a sniffing device is how it would be affected under Kyllo v. United States. Unless such a device was generally available, it’s hard for me to see how it would be distinguished from the Kyllo case, except that involved a residence, and this would only presumably involve a vehicle or personal effects such as luggage. Perhaps the court would rule you have a lesser expectation of privacy. But as it is, a dog sniff doesn’t even constitute a search for 4th Amendment purposes, but if I were to use a device the mimics a dog’s nose, it presumably would. This goes to show the court’s logic in this matter is not entirely consistent.

Getting to Court

IJ put together this lesson on the process of taking a case and getting it to the Supreme Court.  I think it’s useful to give those who don’t really think about the legal process a good insight into just how much work it takes to get a case going.

Another lesson: If there’s anything our legal system does well, it’s kill trees.

Powers to Establish Reciprocity

There are three powers of Congress that HR822, the bill to establish a federal requirement that states recognize each others permits, can be plausibly based on. I think a reasonable order of plausibility goes something like this:

  1. Section 5 power of the 14th Amendment.
  2. Commerce Clause
  3. Full Faith and Credit Clause

HR822 is worded in such a way as to leave open the possibility of arguing all three powers before a court if the law ends up there, which it is nearly certain to. Of all the powers that could be upheld, I think the 14th Amendment power is likely the strongest. HR822, as it stands now, would be a more dubious exercise of the commerce power. Full Faith and Credit is an interesting idea, but the field is undefined enough I wouldn’t want to wager on the outcome. With that in mind, I’ll take a look at each power, plus a few more that Congress could potentially use to legislate in this area.

The Supreme Court has ruled that the Section 5 powers can not impermissibly expand a right beyond that which the courts have interpreted. While the Heller ruling never explicitly reached the subject of bearing arms, except within the home, it did implicitly recognize that there was a pre-existing right to carry a firearm outside the home for self-defense. The Supreme Court was mum on the subject of whether licensing of the right to keep or bear arms is permissible, but given that the vast majority of states have chosen to license the “bear” part, at least outside the home, Congress is probably most comfortably within its Section 5 power not to interfere with licensing standards, and jump ahead of the Courts in establishing the boundaries of the Second Amendment right. We have a pretty clear right to carry firearms in public under Heller, but the definition and boundary of that right are considerably less clear. If Congress is looking to protect this right from state interference, it’s worthwhile to look at opportunities which do not take an expansive definition of the right, leave most of the details in state hands, and performs a lawmaking function the Courts may be reluctant to undertake. Given that licensing can potentially interfere with the right to bear arms, and interferes with the right to travel, it’s a quite plausible exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power to force states to recognize each other’s licenses. It leaves most everything in the hands of individuals states, but merely forces recognition. This is plausibly meant to protect the right to carry in a way that does not interfere with state prerogatives, does not expand the right beyond which the Supreme Court has spoken of, and enacts a policy the Supreme Court is unlikely to reach. Remember that the courts can only strike down laws. Making law is something Congress needs to do.

Aside from the 14th Amendment, the bill is worded in such a way as to claim the commerce power. While a commerce clause claim is almost always plausible, there’s a strong argument that HR822 is outside its scope. First, it’s based on the herpes theory of the commerce clause, which says that if an object moves in interstate commerce, it’s forever within Congress’s prerogative to regulate the object, it’s sale, disposition, or use. The Lopez case, at least in theory eliminated the herpes theory, despite a lack of enthusiasm from lower courts. Absent the herpes theory, one can make a distinction between HR822 and the laws which rely on Congress’ power to ban felons from possessing firearms or ammunition. One could argue that banning felons-in-possesion is part of Congress’ broad, national scheme for the commercial regulations of firearms, with the aim of keeping firearms out of criminal hands as a matter of national policy. In that case it may be said it is necessary and proper to ban possession entirely in order for the national scheme to remain effective. This would be fitting with the standard established in Raich. It’s much harder to make that case with a scheme that mandates reciprocity. How does this scheme contribute to Congress’ national scheme to regulate the commercial market in firearms? One could make the argument that people being afraid to move between states without sufficient protection has a negative net effect in interstate commerce, but this was exactly the argument the Court rejected in Morrison. I think HR822 would stand a chance of being invalidated purely as an exercise of the commerce power, since it is not necessary and proper for the execution of any national regulatory scheme connected to broader commerce.

Could Congress call on the commerce power to establish federal standards for issuance or to establish strict federal standards for reciprocity? Plausibly, yes. But likely only so far as it could be shown that the scheme was “necessary and proper” for the furtherance of national policy on firearms commerce. That’s not as high as standard as I would like, but it’s worth noting that Congress could have done this at any point in the past 20 years. Yet it hasn’t interfered. You can imagine our opponents would have loved federal intervention to put a stop to concealed carry, or frustrate its progress as much as possible. The reason Congress hasn’t is because they are afraid of us as a voting bloc. The reason they will continue not to interfere is the same reason. The commerce powers as they are understood today have existed since the New Deal. These are not new powers.

Finally, Full Faith and Credit is a plausible source of power, which empowers Congress, “by general laws, [to] prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings, shall be proved.” As best as I’ve been able to find in my research, this power is relatively undefined. So Congress may have the power to mandate reciprocity as a matter of Full Faith and Credit, though it may not. There’s good arguments to be made on both sides.

So what other powers could Congress claim to interfere with state prerogatives in this matter? One other I could think of is the Compact Clause, which states, “No State shall, without the consent of Congress, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” It’s generally been interpreted to mean that if Congress does not explicitly object, its consent is implicit. But Congress could have, all along over the past twenty years, presumably invalidated every reciprocity agreement if it had so desired. While the reciprocity compacts are ones that I think would be likely to survive a court challenge absent congressional action, with direct Congressional action, it would look bleak for reciprocity.

There is a wide variety of lawmaking Congress is theoretically empowered to do, under well established precedent, that could shred the rights of gun owners. Where HR822 blazes the most new territory is in the 14th Amendment and Full Faith and Credit powers, where Congress’ can only claim power to protect our rights rather than destroy them. Previously, when all we had was the commerce clause, I was quite wary of Congressional action in regards to reciprocity because of the concerns many have raised about federal power to destroy rather than to protect. Given the whole of Heller and McDonald, I now think it’s a wise thing for Congress to dip its toe into its Section 5 powers, and see how the water feels. The only way we’re going to bring states like California, New Jersey, New York and Massachusetts back under the constitutional umbrella is for Congress to establish that it does not fear to use its 14th Amendment powers to protect the rights of Americans to keep and bear arms.

Self-Defense in the UK

Kevin Baker helps clear up a number of misconceptions, and it gets to something I’ve been talking about with Bitter as the riots raged on. Britons do not have access to handguns and semi-automatic firearms, but they do have access, and not terribly difficult access, to shotguns. I would not feel badly armed with a traditional English side-by-side and plenty of buckshot, even in a riot. The problem isn’t that British society has been disarmed by some evil, malevolent force; it chose to disarm itself, and that is the greater problem. You could bring the very same self-defense laws for England and Wales here to the Untied States, and not much would change; juries are still going to acquit people who defend themselves, no matter what the law says.

I’ve been interested to see whether this causes any kind of sea change in British attitudes toward self-defense and weapons generally. I don’t expect the British to ever have the same type of outlook toward this subject as Americans, but a key thing to watch is whether the police are inundated with applications for shotgun certificates and  firearms certificates. If that’s the case, that will be good evidence that these riots were a wake-up call to the British people, and attitudes may be changing.

Useful Legal Trivia for Today’s Time

It’s worth noting, given rioting and flash mobs, that under Pennsylvania law:

(1)  The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary to prevent such other person from committing suicide, inflicting serious bodily injury upon himself, committing or consummating the commission of a crime involving or threatening bodily injury, damage to or loss of property or a breach of the peace, except that:

(i)  Any limitations imposed by the other provisions of this chapter on the justifiable use of force in self-protection, for the protection of others, the protection of property, the effectuation of an arrest or the prevention of an escape from custody shall apply notwithstanding the criminality of the conduct against which such force is used.

(ii)  The use of deadly force is not in any event justifiable under this subsection unless:

(A)  the actor believes that there is a substantial risk that the person whom he seeks to prevent from committing a crime will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless the commission or the consummation of the crime is prevented and that the use of such force presents no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; or

(B)  the actor believes that the use of such force is necessary to suppress a riot or mutiny after the rioters or mutineers have been ordered to disperse and warned, in any particular manner that the law may require, that such force will be used if they do not obey.

(2)  The justification afforded by this subsection extends to the use of confinement as preventive force only if the actor takes all reasonable measures to terminate the confinement as soon as he knows that he safely can, unless the person confined has been arrested on a charge of crime.

Emphasis is mine. I’ve always taken this section to mean that it’s lawful to use deadly force to disperse rioters, provided the law is followed in this case. I don’t know what “any particular manner the law may require” might mean, and it would not surprise me if no one else knows either. Would this mean putting up a sign in front of your store, during a riot, warning that looters will be shot would suffice as legal warning under this statute? This section is in a part of Pennsylvania law outline the use of force in law enforcement, but this particular section does not limit itself to peace officers.

Generally speaking, I wouldn’t suggest treating any mob or riot situation like a free fire zone; escape is the best strategy if possible. But if not, this statute may provide you with more legal protection in the event you have to shoot your way out of a violent mob, and the government decides they don’t like you trying to survive without their good help. It’s good, at least, to know it’s there.

Don’t Worry Robb

Robb notes that he was filmed on TV committing a felony, based on a section of Florida law that would seem to prohibit firing in a shooting range. By my reading of the statute, because discharging a firearm at a shooting range is not “wanton or malicious,” this crime can’t be applied to such an act.