Premature Celebration

The Brady Center are elated over two recent Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision in regards to gun rights. Two two cases are Commonwealth v. Runyan and Commonwealth v. DePina. Both cases rest a great deal of their reasoning on the fact that the Second Amendment is not incorporated against the state. In the latter DePina case, the entire Second Amendment claim would seem to rest on the lack of incorporation, and also on a related state case Commonwealth v. Davis, which gutted Massachusetts’ right to bear arms provision from its Constitution.

There is some glimmer of hope for the Brady Center though, in the Runyan case, the other leg on the Second Amendment claim was that Massachusetts safe storage law is distinct from that of the District of Colombia. The Massachusetts SJC notes:

Under this provision, an individual with a valid firearms identification card issued under G.L. c. 140, § 129C, is not obliged to secure or render inoperable a firearm while the individual carries it or while it remains otherwise under the individual’s control. A gun owner may therefore carry or keep a loaded firearm under his or her control in his or her home without securing it with a trigger lock or comparable safety device. The gun owner’s obligation to secure the firearm in accordance with the statute arises only when the firearm is stored or otherwise outside the owner’s immediate control.

That may be so, but the exception only provides for carrying or immediate control. Does that apply to sleeping with a loaded gun in your bedside drawer? It’s interesting that the SJC notes in Footnote Seven:

We note that the Court in Heller, supra at 2820, declared that its analysis should not be taken to “suggest the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.” We do not, however, decide whether the defendant’s alleged violation of G.L. c. 140, § 131L (a ), could survive a motion to dismiss if the Second Amendment were made applicable to the States through incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.

To be honest, the SJC probably did us a favor by dismissing Runyan, because I don’t really like the facts of the case. Runyan came about because the mentally disturbed eighteen year old son of defendant Richard Runyan was firing a BB gun at his neighbor’s home. When police arrived, they asked the son if there were other guns in the house, which lead to the discovery of an unsecured rifle. Runyan was not home at the time. If G.L. c. 140, § 131L (a) is to be held unconstitutional, Runyan isn’t the case to do it with. The facts of the case are not good. It would be far better to pursue this claim with a defendant who was home at the time police discovered an unsecured firearm. Runyan also possessed an expired license for the rifle, as required by Massachusetts law, so that further complicates the claim. As it is, Massachusetts used to issue lifetime licenses, but later changed the law, so there are a lot of Massachusetts gun owners walking around with licenses that don’t have expiration dates on them, but are nonetheless expired because they were unaware of the change in the law.

We may have better luck going forward, but I would say this wasn’t the case, and that the Massachusetts SJC probably isn’t a favorable venue for future cases.

Firearms Law Seminar

Looks like I’ll be attending the Firearms Law Seminar this year at the NRA convention in Charlotte. This is something I’ve always meant to attend, but things have been so busy previous years this is the first year I really have a chance.

If I were a lawyer, this would count toward Continuing Legal Education, but they do have a reduced fee for lay persons who want to attend. I think this should be very interesting and educational. Some of my favorite names in Firearms Law will be presenting.

More on the UMass Student

Given that he reports he disposed of the firearm with New Hampshire police, it would seem that he might not be in trouble based on what the law actually says. In this case we’re talking about 18 USC 922(a)(3) which states that it shall be unlawful:

(3) for any person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector to transport into or receive in the State where he resides (or if the person is a corporation or other business entity, the State where it maintains a place of business) any firearm purchased or otherwise obtained by such person outside that State, except that this paragraph (A) shall not preclude any person who lawfully acquires a firearm by bequest or intestate succession in a State other than his State of residence from transporting the firearm into or receiving it in that State, if it is lawful for such person to purchase or possess such firearm in that State, (B) shall not apply to the transportation or receipt of a firearm obtained in conformity with subsection (b)(3) of this section, and (C) shall not apply to the transportation of any firearm acquired in any State prior to the effective date of this chapter;

So it does seem that he’s in the clear if he legally disposed of the firearm in New Hampshire. The question I would have is whether he disposed of it legally. It gets complicated that he’s a Massachusetts resident transferring a gun in New Hampshire, because for that we have 18 USC 922(a)(5):

(5) for any person (other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector) to transfer, sell, trade, give, transport, or deliver any firearm to any person (other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector) who the transferor knows or has reasonable cause to believe does not reside in (or if the person is a corporation or other business entity, does not maintain a place of business in) the State in which the transferor resides; except that this paragraph shall not apply to

(A) the transfer, transportation, or delivery of a firearm made to carry out a bequest of a firearm to, or an acquisition by intestate succession of a firearm by, a person who is permitted to acquire or possess a firearm under the laws of the State of his residence, and

(B) the loan or rental of a firearm to any person for temporary use for lawful sporting purposes;

He turned it into the police, but I would note the police are not a federally licensed dealer or collector. Ironically, he would probably have been in the clear completely had he just sold the gun to an FFL the next day at a gun show. For the act of purchasing the firearm, it would appear this student committed no crime, but the act of turning it into the police may have itself been a federal crime, since the police do not hold a federal firearms license, and are not residents of Massachusetts.

But I think that’s being hyper-technical. I doubt you’ll see any prosecution because the kid transferred it to police, even if it violated a technical letter of the law.

UPDATE: As a commenter points out, the definition of “person” in 18USC921 doesn’t include state agencies, like local police, only individuals, and a few other corporate entities. So there was no crime here.

Brandishing in Kansas

Eugene Volokh reports on an unusual law in Kansas that actually can make the punishment for brandishing a gun higher than if you actually shot someone, under certain circumstances. I agree with Professor Volokh that this is something Kansas groups should get the legislature to fix, pronto.

More on the New Jersey Lawsuit

I’m finally having some time to go over ANJRPC‘s Federal Complaint in detail. The important thing is that this was filed in Federal Court. New Jersey’s court system is notoriously stacked against gun owners. The courts in the Garden State are highly political, sometimes corrupt, and will often ignore plain law. It is fair to say the independence of New Jersey’s courts leaves much to be desired. The Federal Courts are a much better venue to raise questions like this than in New Jersey courts.

We get into federal court through what’s called Federal-question jurisdiction, namely the claim that federal law preempts states for prohibiting the sale of air guns, and that New Jersey is violating said federal law with their rationing scheme. That is the real meat of the case. But because we are raising claims under a federal question, we can also raise claims under Supplemental Jurisdiction, and this lawsuit does that as well. The first concurrent claim related to the original count is raised under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, claiming (legal format altered for space and readability):

Members of Plaintiff Association wish to qualify for one or more of the Exemptions. On or about January 13, 2010, Plaintiff Bach applied for three Handgun Purchase Permits. Plaintiff Bach wishes to apply for the Collector Exemption so he can purchase more than one handgun within a 30 day period, which purchase would satisfy the statutory criteria for the Collector Exemption.

On or about January 14, 2010, Plaintiff Bach inquired of the State Police as to what procedure is available to apply for the Exemptions. The State Police told him that there was none at this time. Upon information and belief, at this time there is no procedure in place by which an applicant can apply for and the Superintendent can grant any of the Exemptions.

Accordingly, certain Plaintiffs and/or Members of Plaintiffs who would qualify for one or more Exemptions, and who would therefore be entitled by law to purchase more than one handgun in a 30 day period are being unlawfully constrained by the One Gun Law, are unable to purchase more than one handgun in a 30 day period, and are unlawfully subject to prosecution if they do so.

Therefore, Plaintiffs are being deprived of their liberty and/or property without due process of law in violation of Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, including, but not limited to, relief enjoining the enforcement of the One Gun Law.

So the law provides for an exception, and the State Police claim to have no procedure for dealing with the new law. This is typical of how New Jersey operates, and New Jersey gun owners should be greatly pleased, for once, they will have to answer for it in court. The next claim is similar, also under the 14th Amendment:

N.J.A.C. 13:54-1.4(h) provides as follows:

Applicants for a permit to purchase a handgun may apply for more than one permit per application. The number of permits requested, and each permit number shall be entered in the spaces provided on the application.

On or about January 7, 2010, Plaintiff Johnson applied for two Handgun Purchase Permits at the Washington Township (Morris County) Police Department. Notwithstanding the One Gun Law, Plaintiff Johnson can save time, effort, and expense by applying for multiple Handgun Purchase Permits simultaneously and lawfully using only one Handgun Purchase Permit with any given 30 day period. On or about January 8, 2010, the Chief of Police of Washington Township notified Plaintiff Johnson by letter that as of January 1, 2010 the New Jersey State Police are only permitting one application for a Handgun Purchase Permit per month and returned the fee for his second Handgun Purchase Permit. By denying Plaintiff Johnson’s right to apply for two Handgun Purchase Permits simultaneously, Defendant Washington violated N.J.A.C. 13:54-1.4(h), which explicitly authorizes such application.

The law actually allows individuals to still apply for more than one permit to purchase at a time. The claim is that police departments are violating the law by refusing to accept applications at a rate of more than one per month. Presumably then it would be up to the purchaser and dealer to ration the gun purchases, however this complaint asks for injunctive relief against the entire law, the two concurrent claims just help make the case stronger, and will possibly put police departments under court order not to enforce any aspects of the one gun a month law.

Police departments in New Jersey having to follow the law when it comes to gun permits? What a novel concept! This suit does not raise any Second Amendment claims, which is prudent given that we do not yet have a ruling in McDonald as of yet as to how the Fourteenth Amendment applies Second Amendment rights to the states.

Split Decision: NRA’s Likely Concern in McDonald

While I’ve been busy with work related items, it’s gotten around that NRA is filing to get some time during the oral arguments of McDonald, effectively splitting Alan Gura’s time before the Court. I’m not meaning to take sides in this, because while I understand NRA’s concern, I’m also willing to give Gura the benefit of doubt in how to argue his case. What I would like to do is explain the issues here as best I can, and try to convey what each side is trying to achieve, and why this might cause some conflict. The Supreme Court’s grant of Certiorari (cert for short) in the McDonald case goes like this:

Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is incorporated as against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities or Due Process Clauses.

That’s a strong indication that the Supreme Court would like to see arguments for both Due Process Clause incorporation and P or I incorporation briefed in this case, and that ground is indeed covered in the Petitioners brief, NRA’s brief and other amicus briefs. By this point, it’s pretty clear that Alan Gura has set out on a path to get the Second Amendment incorporated (properly, in my opinion) under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and NRA favors the more conservative and less risky incorporation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

One can probably get to a motivation for favoring each method by thinking carefully about each party. It would seem Alan Gura came to the gun issue through a generally libertarian legal philosophy, much the same way many of us did. Having already won a landmark case before the Court on one libertarian issue, his place in legal history is assured. But winning a case that overturns Slaughterhouse would make him a legend in legal history. Hell, even just overturning Cruikshank, and bringing that part of the 14th Amendment back to life would be a hell of an accomplishment. Having come to the issue myself through a strongly libertarian bent I loved the Petitioner’s Brief in McDonald. The opportunity to bring the Privileges or Immunities clause back to life is right now, if it’ll ever happen. For someone who loves our Constitution and liberty, this can’t be passed up. I can’t blame Gura for taking the chance. I probably would too in his position, and if he prevails, our Republic will be better for it.

NRA, institutionally, is a lot more conservative, because their only concern is the preservation of Second Amendment rights. Ancillary libertarian concerns aren’t on their mind institutionally. While there might be (well, are, I can tell you) individuals in NRA who are sympathetic to the idea of restoring P or I and overturning Slaughterhouse, NRA as an institution is only concerned with getting a clean and firm ruling on incorporation, and is definitely wary of sacrificing incorporation on the altar of Privileges or Immunities restoration. They are probably concerned that the justices have a chance to hear more about incorporating the Second Amendment under the due process clause like we do with other constitutional rights.

So what’s the real risk? Who the hell cares how it’s incorporated, as long as it’s incorporated, right? I suspect what NRA is looking to avoid is a judicial train wreck of a ruling, where you get something like three justices voting on incorporation through Privileges or Immunities, three justices voting on incorporation through Due Process, and three voting on no incorporation because they think Heller was wrong, and the Second Amendment isn’t any real fundamental right that need be incorporated against the states. In a hypothetical ruling like that, you have no clear majority opinion, so the Marks rule is used:

The Marks Rule has raised the following schools of thought regarding the appropriate basis for determining the holding in such fractured cases: (a) the narrowest analysis essential to the result derived from a combination of all concurring opinions; (b) the concurring opinion offering the narrowest rationale; or (c) only those parts of the concurring opinions which overlap and arrive at the same result. For example, if one follows the first interpretation, then the holding in the case should be viewed as the narrowest rationale supported by all of the concurring opinions read together as though it were a single majority opinion, and where there is a conflict, the opinion based on the narrowest ground governs.

You can see how it might complicate things in moving forward on Second Amendment rights in the future, if we were to get McDonald in a plurality opinion. This would seem especially true since Marks may not quite cleanly apply. Is P or I more “narrow” than Due Process? NRA would presumably like to avoid the potential for this, and just have a clean ruling following the same legal reasoning as other Constitutional rights. They are going to, therefore, be concerned the justices aren’t able to hear enough oral argument along those lines.

Not that I believe Alan Gura is being reckless or daredevil in the way he’s decided to argue his case. The Supreme Court asked for this, really. What reason they have is not really something we can know, but they did. I can’t believe they would have granted cert the way they did if they weren’t interested exploring both options. I also still strongly believe that we will have incorporation at the end of the day. I sincerely hope we can have incorporation by Alan Gura succeeding in overturning Slaughterhouse and/or Cruikshank, but I’ll take it any way I can get it. Still, I think NRA has a valid concern in wanting time. Presumably if they are granted time, it’ll be Stephen Halbrook before the Court. I think either way this goes, our rights are in very good hands. We are fortunate to have competent and highly talented people working this issue on our behalf before the Court.

A Debate We Know All Too Well

If you’ve followed the carry movement around the country, you all know that sometimes there are sometimes “issues” with what’s a public place, locations that are exempt from laws, and related matters. Turns out we’re not the only ones.

A decades-long dispute between Hare Krishnas and the Los Angeles International Airport over soliciting donations appears to be nearing a resolution, as the California Supreme Court heard arguments Wednesday over whether the airport is a public place.

The International Society for Krishna Consciousness of California argues that the airport is much like a public park, and should therefore be open to solicitors.

California’s other major airports are supporting Los Angeles’ position that airports are private property. …

The Los Angeles City Council passed a law in 1997 prohibiting the receiving of donations at the city-owned airport.

As Tony Woodlief said: “… anyone who ever enjoyed ‘Airplane!’ kind of has to be rooting for them just a little.”

I’m rooting for them. Not because I want a flower, but because I find it hard to believe the argument that the entire airport property can be owned by the city and yet somehow private. It’s publicly owned, it’s a public place. Obviously, I would agree there can be restrictions such as the secure areas, and reasonable bans should be allowed. The city probably owns offices, but I don’t believe that it means we get to play frisbee with out dogs down the corridors of those offices. But having a higher burden of proving a restriction is reasonable is not a bad thing.

Scalia Defends His Position

Looks like he did so at a speech for the Mississippi College School of Law. Sadly they don’t go much into what he said about the Second Amendment, but they do cover Scalia’s warnings about appeal to international law. I have to agree with this part too:

Scalia also said that he was worried by a mounting trend of appointing career judges to the judiciary. Scalia, 73, is a former appeals court judge, but he had also worked in private practice, as a law professor and in the administration of President Gerald Ford before Ronald Reagan nominated him to the Supreme Court in 1982.

“Every aspect of your career broadens your outlook and the insights that you would have. It’s good for the Court to have people with varied backgrounds. One of the things I’m concerned about is that in recent years, nobody who has been appointed has come from another bench,” Scalia said. […]

[…] Calling European judges “the most blinkered bureaucrats,” Scalia said that career judges in European systems can develop a sympathy for the government’s side of a case, having worked for the government their entire professional lives.

“You contrast that with the Anglo-Saxon system, where in the most important courts the judges not only have not been spending their whole life with their snout in the public trough, they’ve been suing the government,” Scalia said. “They’ve been defending their clients against the government. (It’s) a different mind, a different mindset.”

I would love to have someone on the bench who’s built a career out of suing the government. Maybe someday a future president can put Alan Gura on the Court :)

Tony Martin and English Self-Defense Laws

Calling back to a great scene in a classic 80s comedy film:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rdjblkRkoPU[/youtube]

You can’t have a discussion about self-defense in the United Kingdom without gun owners pulling Tony Martin out of their asses, but I often wonder how many gun owners have a deep understanding of the case, and what the facts were surrounding it. To understand why takes a bit of delving into self-defense law in both the UK and US. While I’m far from an expert on these topics, I think I do have enough rudimentary understanding to try to explain the background, and illustrate how the Martin case shows the differences in self-defense laws between the US and the UK.

Despite common belief, English self-defense laws have changed little since 1968.  You can see the current law here, which just clarifies the common law in England a bit. Self-defense in the UK can best be described as:

A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.

For contrast, you can find Pennsylvania’s law here. Pennsylvania justifies the use of force (not deadly force) under limited circumstances, and proscribes the use of deadly force except in extreme and dire circumstances.  American self-defense laws commonly make a distinction between the use of force and the use of deadly force, where as English law attempts to cover the whole spectrum of force through a reasonableness test.  If you use deadly force or force in most of the United States, you will still be subject to a similar reasonableness test, but a jury will be asked whether you acted reasonably, as a reasonable person, in terms of the circumstances under which you acted. In the United Kingdom, the jury will be asked whether the force you used was reasonable. In American law, that’s spelled out more distinctly. Pennsylvania, for instance, allows you to use whatever force is necessary, not  reasonable, though Pennsylvania requires that deadly force is only permitted in certain dire and extreme circumstances.

But despite the differences, to the extent that self-defense in danger across the pond, it’s largely because of shifting cultural attitudes away from the use of deadly force in self-defense. If you brought the self-defense laws of England over to the United States, practically speaking not much would change about self-defense, because most Americans believe that using deadly force on a home invader is reasonable, while Englishmen do not embrace the concept to such a great extent anymore. In addition, American jury verdicts require unanimity, whereas English juries do not require it. These factors promote differences in the kinds of cases that will be prosecuted in each of those respective jurisdictions. Prosecutors are going to respond to what they know they will get out of a jury. Practically speaking, even in a state like Pennsylvania, which does not have Castle Doctrine, a prosecutor is going to be reluctant to bring a case of a homeowner shooting a home invader because that case is highly likely to end in acquittal. He will take care to make sure the facts of the case show a serious wrong or error on the part of the actor, more care than his English counterpart, because his English counterpart only has to get 10 out of 12 jury members to believe that the homeowners use of force was out of proportion, and therefore not reasonable. While it’s still theoretically justifiable to use deadly force in self-defense in England, it is much more likely to result in prosecution there, because it’s much more likely to result in conviction. Self-defense has not been eradicated in the UK, but it has been weakened. Changing mores about self-defense are only part of the story. There’s a much larger story at play here, a big part of which is an increasing belief that jury trials themselves are anachronistic and outdated, as has been shown in the recent decision that juries in criminal trials are not strictly necessary in England and Wales.

It is in these two contexts that you have to consider the case of Tony Martin. To see details of the case, I would encourage folks to read this appeals ruling in the Marin case. From this you can get a hint of how the English legal system deliberates on the topic of self-defense:

So now we have the background on the appeal, whether Martin, who was found guilty of using excessive force against burglars, can be convicted of murder, or is merely guilty of manslaughter. But in the appeal, we have the facts of the case, and from that we can see where Mr. Martin likely got into trouble:

When he was interviewed under caution he gave an account to the police officers which was basically similar to that which he gave in evidence. He stated particularly that he wanted to make it clear that when he fired his gun he genuinely thought that his life was in danger. He asserted that he had never got to the bottom of the stairs and had gone no further than was necessary to see into the hallway; that was about as far as he dared to go.

He was cross-examined on the basis that his evidence and the account he had given in interview was untrue; that he had heard the two men approaching the house and had readied himself so that by the time they entered the breakfast room he was downstairs, lying in wait in the hall with his gun already loaded; and that he had stepped out into the breakfast room and fired three times with the intention of killing. Mr Martin denied this version; although he acknowledged the effect of the expert evidence about two of the shots at any rate, he insisted that he himself never got below halfway down the stairs, and that when he was interviewed he was clear as to where he had been

The problem Martin had was that the forensic evidence the Crown put forward did not match Martin’s statement, but rather matched up with those of the burglars.

Two areas of shot damage were found on the far wall of the breakfast room from the door at the foot of the stairs, one below the window out of which the two men exited, and one to its right in a door. All the experts agreed that these two areas of damage were not in the direct line of sight of a person standing anywhere on the stairs, so that the shots that caused that damage could therefore not have been fired from the stairs.

Under the circumstances described in this appeal, in many US jurisdictions, prosecutors would still have had statutory legal grounds to bring charges for murder (though there are a number where they would not). But statutory law is not necessarily the law as juries see it, since a jury and a prosecutor aren’t necessarily going to view the same set of circumstances the same way. I’m not certain that Martin would have been prosecuted in the US, because most juries are going to tend to acquit a homeowner for shooting a burglar, let alone two burglars, especially when the actor is an old man, and the burglars young men. I suspect had Martin had better representation from the start, and not given a statement to police without the advice of counsel, he might have been able to escape conviction in England as well. The Martin case isn’t as simple and straightforward as many imagine it to be, but in looking closely at the facts and rulings in the case, you can see clearly how the our respective cultures are parting in their treatment of self-defense.

California Body Armor Statute Tossed for Vagueness

Via RideFast, it looks like the California ban on possession of Body Armor by convicted felons has been tossed out by a California appeals court.  You can find the ruling here. It’s largely a problem of how California defines the term “body armor.”  The federal standard is probably better for those purposes, which can be found in 18 USC 921:

(35) The term "body armor" means any product sold or offered for sale, in interstate or foreign commerce, as personal protective body covering intended to protect against gunfire, regardless of whether the product is to be worn alone or is sold as a complement to another product or garment.

Now, in this case, the federal law might not apply, since the jacket in question was a flak jacket, and stated clearly it didn’t protect against small arms fire. But the federal definition only hinges on how the product is marketed, not on its actual capabilities. This would prevent an absurd result, such as possession of boiler plates by felons being unlawful, under the theory that they can stop some bullets, and could possibly be worn underneath clothing.