NJ Superior Court Ruling on Gun Permits

The ruling can be found here in PDF format. There’s a lot of things to say about it. For one, it gives you an idea of what one must go through to get all the required licenses to get a gun in New Jersey. It looks like the problem for this guy started when one of his references said something negative. Eventually they decided to go this route:

At the end of oral argument on the appeal, the trial court asked the parties whether they would have any objection to the court communicating directly with appellant’s former employers regarding his fitness to own a gun. The parties consented to this unusual procedure.

Apparently that didn’t go well for him either, as his previous associates said he was a nut job, and shouldn’t have a gun. This is a bad plaintiff to make a constitutional challenge, unfortunately, but probably the biggest risk to our gun rights is cases like this being moved forward. There are plenty of people that get kicked around by NJ’s system that would make far more sympathetic plaintiffs. But let’s get back to the case:

We conclude that the trial court’s conduct of the proceedings on the appeal from the denial of appellant’s application for a permit to purchase firearms did not conform with the requirements of procedural due process set forth in Weston. Therefore, the order affirming the denial of that application must be reversed and the matter remanded for a rehearing conducted in conformity with Weston.

So essentially the guy won, because the trial court did not follow the legal procedure in order to approve or deny permits. But the court also addressed the constitutional issued raised. The issue was one of vagueness, arguing that a previous New Jersey ruling upholding the “unfit persons” standard needed to be reconsidered in light of Heller.

However, the Court expressly indicated that its holding did not require invalidation of statutes that require a license to purchase or possess a firearm.

The Court did not require it because it was not at issue in the case. The New Jersey Superior Court has before it a direct challenge to an aspect of licensing. It’s not intellectually serious to so casually dismiss the constitutional issue, as if the Court in Heller had upheld licensing. Licensing wasn’t before that court, it is before this court. So you can’t act as if they upheld licensing. They did not.

The appellant in this case also challenged based on the time it took to issue a denial. Court in New Jersey have long held the statutory requirement that permit be issued within 30 days is effectively without meaning.

Moreover, we do not believe the Legislature could have intended that a person who is unfit to own a firearm would be able to obtain a firearms purchaser permit based on such an automatic approval. Our gun control laws have the purpose of “keeping firearms out of the hands of all dangerously unfit persons, noncriminal as well as criminal.” Burton v. Sills, supra, 53 N.J. at 94; see also Heller, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 678 (noting that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill”). This salutary purpose would be seriously undermined if a person could obtain a permit to purchase a firearm based solely on a court’s failure to conduct a hearing within the thirty-day period required by N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(d).

Except Heller does not support what you specifically mentioned New Jersey’s gun control laws were meant to do, which was “keeping firearms out of the hands of all dangerously unfit persons, noncriminal as well as criminal.” Heller didn’t say “longstanding prohibitions against on the possession of firearms by noncriminals the police say are dangerous.” There’s an element of having to be convicted or adjudicated in the Heller language, which this man was not.

Pretty clearly the Superior Court was not interested in taking Heller seriously, and I can’t say I’m surprised to see that kind of attitude coming out of a New Jersey court. New Jersey’s gun laws are a disaster for lawful gun owners, but the unfortunate thing for Garden State gunnies is there’s a lower hanging fruit out there. The real danger is that inexperienced people will begin challenging New Jersey laws immediately, before we’ve had a chance to get that low hanging fruit.  After which we’ll have more tools at our disposal to go after New Jersey’s permitting system, among other things.

What Passes for Legal Reasoning

Laci the Dog, I’m pretty sure, should be called Laci the Troll, because I find it difficult to believe that a lawyer could be so obtuse on matters of law. As Mike W mentioned, her blog is relatively devoid of intellectual argument. This here is the latest justifying bans on semi-autos because they can be readily restored to fully automatic fire. She should stick to whatever law she practices, because firearms law is not her forte. The closest Supreme Court case we have on this topic is Staples v. US:

We concur in the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion on this point: “It is unthinkable to us that Congress intended to subject such law abiding, well intentioned citizens to a possible ten year term of imprisonment if . . . what they genuinely and reasonably believed was a conventional semiautomatic [weapon] turns out to have worn down into or been secretly modified to be a fully automatic weapon.”

The fundamental issue in Staples is whether or not Congress intended to eliminate the mens rea requirement that’s required in most crimes. The Court ruled that the government had to prove guilty intent when it came to possessing a semiautomatic firearm that was capable of firing automatically. In none of the Courts reasoning in Staples did they indicate that possession of any semi-automatic firearm was in violation of National Firearms Act. In fact, the majority rejected the argument that possession of a semi-automatic could meet the mens rea requirement. In fact, the Court in Staples makes the assumption that Congress did not intend to make semi-automatic firearms legally risky, let alone illegal.

So no, Laci, semi-autos aren’t covered by this law, no matter how much you wish it were so.

Appeal to the Supreme Court on PLCAA

The case is Adames, et al v. Beretta USA Corp, and they are asking that the Supreme Court review the constitutionality of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which immunizes manufactures, distributors, and dealers from certain types of lawsuits in federal and state court.  As SCOTUSBlog points out:

The narrower issue in the Illinois case is whether the specific lawsuit by the dead boy’s parents fits within an exception in the 2005 law that permits some cases to go ahead.  The broader issue is whether Congress has intruded too deeply into the way states craft their own laws, barring those that test issues arising under state common law, allowing at least some that test a state statute.  The petition quotes at length from congressional floor debates, with lawmakers blasting juries and judges for fashioning “novel” ways to attack the gun industry while showing respect for laws that emerge from state legislatures.

The tragedy that led to the Adames lawsuit in Illinois occurred eight years ago, when 13-year-old Billy Swan aimed and fired a Beretta pistol at a friend who had come over to play, Joshua Adames, who also was 13. The gun belonged to Billy’s dad, a Cook County sheriff’s deputy. Billy had taken out the gun’s clip before aiming it, believing that would make it harmless. A bullet that had remained in the gun’s chamber killed Joshua.

Under standard product liability law, manufacturers are liable for defects in design.  Typically this requires a manufacture to make a product more safe if they can possibly do so, without impacting its function.  The problem is, the function of a gun is to send a chunk of metal flying at very high speed out the barrel if you pull the trigger.  In this case, a gun was pointed at someone, and the trigger was pulled.  That the user did not know how to unload a firearm properly is not the fault of the manufacturer.

No doubt the plaintiff will claim a simple change in the design to include a magazine disconnect safety would have made the firearm safer without impacting the function.  But this is not really the case, especially for a police officer, as there are situations where you want the round in the pipe to go off even if the magazine is out.  Magazine disconnects are also dangerous in and of themselves, for reasons we’ve covered on here.

But the question of whether PLCAA preempts such lawsuits is an interesting one.  If you look at the language of the act, it gives this exception to the lawsuit immunity:

(v) an action for death, physical injuries or property damage resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner, except that where the discharge of the product was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense, then such act shall be considered the sole proximate cause of any resulting death, personal injuries or property damage

I would say if this was just a standard argument of defect in design, this exception would apply.  But it’s the last part on “caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense.” that probably makes the Adames unable to claim this exemption, because pointing a gun at someone and pulling the trigger is a criminal act, even if unintentional.  In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized this, and restored the summary judgement of a lower court in favor of the defendant (Beretta).

The petition for cert is essentially asking to the Court to find the PLCAA unconstitutional under the 10th Amendment, which I think is a bit of a hail mary argument, considering preempting state tort actions that affect the interstate market in a product is pretty clearly within Congress’ commerce cause powers.  But they go further to argue along these grounds:

Congress’ clearly expressed preference for legislative determinations of grounds for liability over judicial applications of the common law in the PLCAA dictate to the States how its law must be made, at least when liability is to be assessed against the firearms industry. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii) (creating an exception to the immediate-dismissal dictate so long as the lawsuit is authorized by certain legislative actions); see also 15 U.S.C. § 7903(2)(a)(7) (finding stating that liability actions against gun manufacturers and dealers could only be imposed “by a maverick judicial officer or petit jury [and] would expand civil liability in a manner never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, by Congress, or by the legislatures of the several States”) (emphasis added); Id. at § 7901(a)(8) (finding stating that plaintiffs in the actions intended to be preempted were “us[ing] the judicial branch to circumvent the Legislative branch”).

They are basically arguing that Congress only intended to usurp state judicial authority rather than legislative authority citing this exception as evidence:

(iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product

But this section also includes two examples that give some idea of what Congress meant, and I don’t think it’s favorable to the plaintiff in this case.  I think Congress did intend to preempt state laws that would hold gun manufacturers accountable for third party criminal acts.  What Congress did not intend to do is preempt state law regarding the sale and marketing of firearms.  I think the Illinois Supreme Court got it right.  I expect the Supreme Court will decline to hear this case.

Pin & Weld No Longer Viable?

Ry points out that ATF does not seem to have the pin & weld method in their April 2009 handbook, meaning hundreds of thousands, possibly millions of gun owners out there could have just become instant felons!  ATF has considered pinned and welded extensions to a barrel to be part of the barrel for purposes of determining length under the National Firearms Act.  This Bushmaster, for instance, would be a Short Barreled Rifle under this new rule, and would fall under NFA requirements.  Current owners would have to register them with ATF as SBRs, or face prosecution.

Typically, something like this is not as simple as ATF making a change to its handbook.  You have a few different federal laws that govern the changing of rules.  Namely the Federal Register Act of 1935 and the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, along with a few others.  A quick search of the Federal Register doesn’t show any rule change about pinning and welding barrels, but the Code of Federal Regulations also contain nothing the stipulates flash hiders, brakes, or other items pinned and welded to the end of a barrel count toward barrel length.

This means that the pin and weld technique was an “agency determination” rather than a rule or regulation.  ATF is infamous for preferring to exercise it’s regulatory power this way rather than use rule making, which is a more controlled and predictable process.  Regulated persons or entities can challenge an agency determiniation, in which case the courts will review under the standard that the decision was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  There’s no set standard for what is arbitrary or capricious, but typically it would mean that ATF’s determiniation has no basis in law.  ATF does not have a good track record with its determiniations.  See Vollmer v. Higgins, which was an NFA case:

It is true that the National Firearms Act covers machineguns, as well as short-barrelled rifles and shotguns, even if they have been modified, so long as they can be “readily restored.” 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5845(b), (c), & (d).5 Neither the Act nor the Bureau’s regulations, however, define “readily restored.” See 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5845; 27 C.F.R. Sec. 179.11. We do know that, in the Bureau’s view, “firearms” subject to the Act may be excluded from coverage if they are “[a]lter[ed] by removing the feature or features that cause[d] the weapon to be classified as an NFA firearm.” FIREARMS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, ATF Order 3310.4B p 83(e)(2), at 43 (Feb. 8, 1989). Alterations of this sort include welding an extension onto a rifle or shotgun barrel; and welding closed a slot on certain handguns to prevent the attachment of a shoulder stock. Id. p 83(f)(2) & (4), at 43. The Bureau must believe that if welding removes a critical feature, the firearm cannot be “readily restored” and it therefore can be removed from the firearm classification. In the case of the modified HK receiver, the critical features were the lack of the attachment block and the presence of a hole. Vollmer’s welding the attachment block back onto the magazine and filling the hole it had drilled do not appear to be significantly different from the operations the Bureau describes as sufficient to remove a short-barrelled rifle or shotgun from the category of “firearm.” It would seem to follow that Vollmer’s operations thus removed the HK receiver from the category of machinegun.

So I think we would have room to challenge ATF’s determiniation in court.  For people who already own these firearms, the legal hazard was always there, because you’re possessing a firearm in a legal grey area in regards to barrel length.  Determinations don’t really mean crap if an ambitious AUSA wants to try to stick it to you.  But if I were to put money on it, ATF’s determiniation won’t hold up in court, especially if they try to argue that a millions of gun owners suddenly being made criminals isn’t really a problem, considering they are still allowing for extension by other methods that are really no better than pin and weld.

Do the anti-gun folks still want to come argue that the gun industry is unregulated, and guns are less regulated than teddy bears?

Explosives vs. Destructive Devices

I should note, based on some of the conversation going on in the previous post, that there’s a difference between a destructive device and an explosive.  True, that explosives are often a component of destructive devices, but merely being an explosive doesn’t qualify.  Also, not all things that make loud noises, or somewhat resemble the action of an explosive, are actually explosives.

Generally speaking, the possession of explosives by civilians is regulated at both the federal and state level, but is not terribly restrictive under most circumstances.  You can get a license, without too much difficulty, to manufacture and handle explosives.  Federal regulations contain distinctions between explosives, pyrotechnics, and blasting agents, but generally, aren’t regulated as destructive devices.

What makes something a destructive device, according to federal regulations is that it is “designed or redesigned for use as a weapon.”  Generally speaking, a pipe bomb is a destructive device that contains explosives.  What makes it a destructive device is that the “pipe” which surrounds the explosive is meant to fragment and send shrapnel in all directions, traveling along with the blast wave created by the explosive.  The government would argue that the only reason to possess such a device is as a weapon.  The court, in the case mentioned, found it unlikely such a device would be possessed for the purposes of self-defense, given the indiscriminate nature of a shrapnel driven by explosives.

PLCAA Fails to Gain Another Dismissal

Far from the claims that the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act would offer blanket immunity to the gun industry from suit, it once again is shown not to be the case.

Once appeared here a quote from the SLC Tribune, but I removed it because they work with the scum of the earth Righthaven. The dealer being sued was fined because the sale of the shotgun was illegal, so the suit was allowed to proceed.

It’s not the kind of suit that PLCAA was meant to stop, so it can go forward.  It was only meant to prevent cities from suing gun manufacturers on completely bogus premises, like they are responsible for all the crime in the city, and are creating a public nuisance.

PLCAA Being Read Narrowly by New Jersey Court

A Morris County Superior Court judge is allowing a suit to go forward against Sarco, a New Jersey based distributor of firearms.  The facts seem to be that an employee stole a firearm from a shipment of guns, which was later used to shoot and severely wound a police officer.  Sarco has offered a half million dollar settlement to the officer wounded.

I think, in terms of the PLCAA, that it probably doesn’t apply to this case, which is a negligence suit.  But the circumstances surrounding this suit make me skeptical of the negligence claim.  Sarco claims a shipment arriving from a California dealer that was shutting down had firearms missing from it, one of which their employee apparently stole.  Sarco claims that it is the sender’s responsibility to file the FFL Theft/Loss form.  That is correct, as we can see from the Federal Register:

If a firearm is lost or stolen in transit, the notation in the acquisition and disposition book of the transferor/sender that the firearm was disposed of to a particular transferee/buyer is inaccurate. Therefore, a transferor/sender must verify that the transferee/buyer received the shipped firearm in order to fulfill his/her statutory responsibility to maintain accurate records. 18 U.S.C. 922(m), 923(g)(1)(A), and 923(g)(2).

I think this makes it difficult to say that Sarco was the responsible party here from a legal point of view, since as best they knew the shipment arrived with the guns already missing, which puts the legal onus on the sending FFL for reporting.  In that instance, the negligence suit will have to be decided on whether or not Sarco’s security procedures were sufficient to prevent unauthorized employees from tampering with shipments.  That should be a harder case to make than if they had actually violated ATF regulations, but I suspect they are offering settlement because they realize an injured police officer before a jury, against a gun distributor, in a New Jersey court, is not likely to turn out well for them.

Why Sarco chooses to locate in a state that is decidedly hostile to their line of business is a mystery to me.  I can think of several nearby states that would be a better place to do business.

Incorporation of 2A Rejected in 7th Circuit

Decision here.  It seems to rest Cruikshank, Presser and Miller still being valid law, even though the last of those cases was decided in 1894, before the modern selective incorporation doctrine.

The Court did not say that Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller rejected a particular argument for applying the second amendment to the states. It said that they hold “that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government.” The Court added that “Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation” is “a question not presented by this case”. Ibid. That does not license the inferior courts to go their own ways; it just notes that Cruikshank is open to reexamination by the Justices themselves when the time comes. If a court of appeals may strike off on its own, this not only undermines the uniformity of national law but also may compel the Justices to grant certiorari before they think the question ripe for decision.

Despite a lot of obvious bias against the Second Amendment coming through, what they have done here is essentially kicked ball over to the Supreme Court.  The circuit split makes it very likely the Supreme Court will hear the appeal.

Judicial Empathy

Jennifer has a very good post on judicial empathy, using as her example the case in Oklahoma where a pharmacist is charged with first degree murder for finishing off a kid who tried to rob his store, as he apparently laid bleeding and unconscious on the ground.  I am not an advocate of there being no empathy in law.  It’s an important component for having a justice system, rather than just having a legal system.

But in our system of law, judges need to stand as impartial arbiters of the law.  The empathy should not come from the judge, it should come from the prosecutor, in his decision as to whether or not to bring charges, and it should come from a jury, in their duty to stand in judgment as peers of the defendant.

It was John Jay, the first Cheif Justice of the United States who said, “The jury has the right to judge both the law as well as the fact in controversy.”  I would also say not just the law, but also to judge it’s particular application.  Jennifer makes a good point about empathy.  Put either of us on that jury, and I don’t think we’d convict.  By the letter of the law, the man would appear to be guilty of murder, but justice would not be served by him being separated from his family, and sent to prison.   He did not ask to have his store robbed, and his life threatened.  He was not the person that created the lethal circumstances.  I’ll be surprised if there’s a jury in Oklahoma that will convinct him of these charges.

Kopel on Sotomayor

Dave Kopel discusses the new Supreme Court nominee’s likely views on the Second Amendment based on a very recent decision that Sotomayor played a role in coming out of New York.  His analysis is fairly thorough, and he ends with this concern:

Judge Sotomayor’s record suggests hostility, rather than empathy, for the tens of millions of Americans who exercise their right to keep and bear arms.